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Anne Khademian's book, The SEC and Capital Market Regulation: The
Politics of Expertise, is a case study in the field of political science whose
objective is to demonstrate that some bureaucratic groups-in this case, the
SEC staff-are capable of effectively exercising political power because of the
expertise they possess. The book succeeds in synthesizing a large amount of
information about the history and structure of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. It ultimately stumbles, however, because of unresolved
ambiguities about the nature of the expertise which the SEC staff possesses.
There is a second book lurking within the first that has an audience outside
political science: a non-specialist account of the history and activities of the
Securities and Exchange Commission based upon the literature and extensive
first hand interviews with SEC staff, SEC commissioners, and congressional
staff by an author who is uncritical if not a little star struck by her subject. The
advantage of this book over its predecessors is that it carries the story up
through the Reagan Administration. The book includes a comprehensive and
up-to-date bibliography of sources relating to the SEC useful to any student of
the subject. This second book is more successful than the first, and it is in that
role that the book should find its way onto the shelves of those who wish to
have an overview of the field of securities regulation as it is conventionally
understood.
The author's main argument is based on a simple story about the SEC. After
early ambiguity about exactly what the SEC was to accomplish, the agency
settled into a "disclosure and enforcement" vision of its mission. Disclosure
means that the agency requires those subject to its regulation to disclose the
truth about their activities. Enforcement means that if they fail to disclose the
truth, the agency will, upon discovery of noncompliance, initiate legal
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proceedings against the violator. This vision has been subjected to a frontal
challenge three times: first, when members of Congress attempted to prod the
agency to implement a "national market system"; second, when John Shad, the
Chairman under the Reagan Administration, attempted to change the
Commission into a promoter of the industry and make it more sensitive to
economic ideas; and third, either when the Commission decided to implement,
a system of electronic disclosure or when Congress decided to challenge the
Commission's implementation of electronic disclosure. All challenges have
failed upon confronting the well established norm of disclosure and enforcement
whose high priesthood is the Commission staff and practicing securities
lawyers.
The organization of the book is straight-forward. The introductory chapter
relates the importance of Khademian's study to the political science literature.
The second chapter, "A Regulatory Framework", recounts the passage of the
Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and the early
experience of their administration, which resulted in an early focus on
disclosure and enforcement. The third chapter, "Expansion, Delineation and
Institutionalization", describes how the disclosure and enforcement perspective
has been defended in the administration of the acts. The fourth chapter,
"Maintaining Disclosure-Enforcement", describes the network of intersecting
interests and objectives that sustain the disclosure and enforcement vision. The
fifth chapter, "A Decade of Activism", describes challenges to disclosure and
enforcement in the 1970s. The sixth chapter, called "Breaking the Rules",
describes the Commission under theChairmanship of John Shad, appointed by
President Reagan, and the efforts to change the SEC in the 1980s. The last two
chapters essentially summarize the previous chapters.
A unique resource used in the book is over one hundred hours of interviews
conducted by the author with the regulatory "players" in the Commission,
Congress, and the industry. The identities of the interviewees are not disclosed
because they were promised anonymity so that they would feel free to speak
frankly. To further encourage candor, the author did not tape record the
interviews. She reports that "many spoke openly and frankly."' No doubt the
interviews helped the author prepare her intelligent and informed summary of
the Commission's history and activities.2 But they do not appear to have
yielded any novel information. Their significance is difficult to judge because
1. Page 231.
2. I have noticed two minor errors. On page 25, discussing the law prior to the federal securities acts,
she contends: "The quality of protection and the level of enforcement varied from one state to another, but
even the most effective antifraud statutes did not regulate interstate trafficking in securities." Of course,
this is not wholly accurate in light of the broad reaching federal mail fraud statute governing at that time.
And on page 116 she states: "Without larger staffs to police the disclosure activities of corporations, for
example, the agency requires the vigilance of lawyers to alert it to discrepancies." Although some on the
SEC staff might wish it to be the case, and the SEC has taken positions that imply it should be the case,
the reality is that the agency does not receive its information from lawyers whose clients do not conform
to the regulation.
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at no place in the book are the interviews as a whole summarized. Instead,.
snippets are quoted from time to time in support of the author's points. One
strong theme that appears to have been made repeatedly in the interviews is that
the SEC staff is wonderful.3
Aside from the personal interviews, Khademian's research draws mainly
from existing literature and government documents. There is no effort to access
previously unknown material or to offer new interpretations of the known
material.
The methodology of the argument is avowedly qualitative not quantitative.
No effort is made to plot degrees of expertise on a numeric scale and then to
test whether there is a correlation between expertise so measured and some
numeric scale of power. There are no numbers and no equations. This gives
the book a human and accessible character, and is an appropriate and necessary
approach to the subject matter. Some social scientists undoubtedly find the
methodology unscientific. But the issue of the role of expertise is important,
and should not be ignored because currently fashionable methodologies cannot
be used to study it.
As the author recognizes, her argument faces the problem of separating
bureaucratic behavior that endures because it is precisely what the members of
Congress and the industry want from behavior that endures in spite of the
wishes of members of Congress and the industry because it is defended by an
3. The following are examples of such snippets from the book: "From the beginning, it was blue-ribbon
selection for staff and commissioners, and there was great dependence placed on the agency and reliance
to help steer the country to better economic footing .... And I think that there are many people in the
industry who feel more secure knowing that regulation is even-handed and fair." Page 127. "We are taken
seriously because we have no axe to grind. Our work is more respected than, say, FERC. They are industry
driven. When we send a bill [to Congress], from a technical standpoint, no one would suggest anything
[about the SEC's motives]. We are a cleaner agency. I say cleaner; I mean less industry-dominated." Page
156. "There is a trusting about the SEC.... The SEC is not political, and there is excessive respect for
the agency. And the fact that securities legislation is very complicated, and consequential; no one wants
to screw up." Page 189. "If I were ever to write a book about the SEC I would call it the 'peculiar
institution.' It really is.... It's amazingly well insulated from politics, even with the scandals of the Nixon
administration. The moral of those incidents is you can't fix the SEC.... It has a high quality staff, and
there are some people there who really have a sense of mission. The government would be better off if it
could infuse that spirit elsewhere in the government." Page 206.
The author argues that one reason the staff is independent is that the staff lawyers do not regularly
go to work for firms in the industry after leaving the Commission. Instead, they go to work for law firms
who represent the firms in the industry. The possibility that the staff serves the interest of the law firms
by creating additional legal work for them to perform (and for the staff to perform in their new employment)
is not discussed. 'To prove that they can do good work, these attorneys must demonstrate their legal
expertise. This has enormous implications for the agency's regulatory approach.., as well as for its relative
independence from the interests that it regulates. Law firms will evaluate these staff members, as aspiring
members of the securities bar, by their legal skills rather than by the impact of rules or decisions on
particular interests.... [Quoting two interviewees:] 'When you go to the SEC you don't work for much,
but when you go back [to the private sector] you can make a lot. At the SEC, it doesn't do you any good
to curry favor with the defense contractors... People don't go to work for the industry, they go to work
for law firms, not brokerage firms."' Page 90.
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expert bureaucracy. The author does not insist that there is a sharp distinction,
creating ambiguity about the nature of the expertise whose effects she is
examining.
Although the author attributes "expertise" to the staff, and credits that
expertise with the power to affect political events, she does not analyze or
define what that expertise might be.4 There are moments when she seems to
analogize it to the expertise of an engineer, who might know, for instance, how
to build a bridge that won't fall down. Drawing upon some of the more
controversial explanations of the 1987 stock market crash, she suggests that
some members of Congress are reluctant to challenge the SEC staff because
interfering with their expertise might remove the staffs support from the
market, causing it to crash.5 The image of the expert staff laboring daily to
hold the market up in the face of the forces of decline is comical to
contemplate. At other moments, expertise seems to result from the fact that the
staff is in a strategic position in which it can use its preferred access to
information and ability to interact with all the players to punish those who stand
in its way. The SEC staff is, for instance, able to make use of the fact that any
violation of the statute or regulations is criminal. Although the SEC itself does
not have the power to initiate criminal prosecutions, it can always refer matters
to the Department of Justice. Thus, every SEC investigation is potentially
criminal in nature. The Commission and its staff have the same insulation from
politicians as do criminal prosecutors. A congressperson, White House staff
member, or even president who seeks to influence an SEC proceeding can
always be accused of acting as an accessory after the fact.' Most frequently,
the author has a third idea of expertise in mind: that expertise is the
implementation of the program that the relevant political actors desire.
Disclosure-enforcement "satisfies the needs of diverse interests in the securities
industry that are important to Congress, and it gives members of Congress
noncontroversial solutions that are seen as good policy."7 This third concept
of expertise, however, robs the author's hypothesis of much of its power:
expertise becomes doing what the bureaucracy's masters want it to do.
The author treats the example of the SEC staff as a suitable example of
bureaucracy in general, and never pauses to speculate whether the SEC's status
as an independent regulatory agency outside the executive branch makes it a
special case, as its founders intended it to be.
4. The similarity to the idea of deference to agency expertise in judicial review is obvious here.
5. An interviewee explains: "No one wants to be blamed for a catastrophe. Answers are not clear in
this area, particularly in the modem financial world. The markets are delicate and there is a precarious
balance. Certain moves could have unintended consequences, and no one wants to be blamed for that." Page
13. See also page 113.
6. See pages 16-19.
7. Page 118.
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The author is agnostic about what SEC regulation ought to accomplish. She
takes the view of a disinterested observer of the political process, simply
reporting on the interplay of ideas and events. She describes "securities policy"
as "technical and uncertain."' Nor does she consider the possibility that the
SEC does not really do what it professes to do. She does not consider the
possibility that what is most important about SEC disclosure regulation is that
there are many things that the SEC does not require be disclosed. She does not
consider the possibility that SEC as an enforcement agency is a paper tiger.9
Her principal evidence for the enforcement prowess of the SEC is the fact that
it has investigated the rich and politically well-connected. That, however, may
simply result from the fact that violators of the securities laws will often be
rich, and that they seek political connections as protection. The penny stock
scam artists do not seem to find it difficult to operate in violation of SEC
regulation for years.
At one point, she explains the strength of the enforcement vision as follows:
Though the public may decide to pull out of the stock market for a
number of reasons-for example, a recession, inflation, higher interest
rates in the money markets-fear of fraud is often cited as a cause. If
brokers can 'chum' an account---excessive trading of a customer's
account in order to generate commissions-without being caught; if
mutual funds can charge a customer hidden fees and place prohibitive
restrictions on an account; if someone can claim to be an investment
advisor without credentials; if inside traders can profit at the expense
of shareholders; and if fraudulent issues of stock can easily be peddled
to the public, people will consider securities a risky investment and pull
out. Therefore, a strong agency to police these activities is important
to maintain investor confidence. 0
What is striking, about these statements is that there is a great deal of
evidence that they are all true. Many churning cases are brought by the
customers, not the SEC, and it is hard to believe that more than a small
percentage of the victims are able to bring a lawsuit. Mutual funds do charge
hidden fees. People can claim to be an investment advisor without credentials.
Insiders do profit. And fraudulent issues of stock are peddled to the public.
8. Page 11.
9. The SEC is, of course, quite small. After one subtracts the clerical and administrative personnel,
the number of personnel for serious enforcement work is quite limited, and located at only a few locations.
Any truly serious matter must be referred out of the agency to the criminal investigative and prosecuting
agencies.
10. Page 99.
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Does the SEC enforce enough? Or is its real function to help the industry by
working to create a false sense of security, to make the investing public believe
that stocks are not in fact risky?
The episodes described in order to demonstrate that the SEC staff can use
its expertise to prevail over politicians are too complicated and ambiguous to
provide clear support for the author's hypothesis. In the early 1970's, Senator
Harrison Williams pushed the SEC to assume the role of market designer,
leading the creation of a single and integrated national market system. These
initiatives led to legislation, which ultimately had little effect. This role would
certainly have been a departure from the disclosure and enforcement vision of
the SEC's role. On the other hand, the principal objection to giving the SEC
this role is that it would have eliminated competition among different market
institutions, and that the SEC has not had (and never claimed to have) expertise
in market design. One interviewee shrewdly observes that the initiative was
probably designed to enhance fund raising leverage for the senators."
The discussion of Chairman Shad's efforts to increase the influence of
economic thinking at the SEC, which lead to an amusing confrontation with
Congress in which the Congressional committees attempted to cut off funding
from the wrong office, ignores the fact that the most important reform at the
Shad SEC was the expansion of the exemptions from the 1933 Act, and that
the move towards expanding the exemptions began with Congress, not the
commission.'2
The Commission's conflicts with Congress over the troubled implementation
of a system of electronic filing and disclosure (called EDGAR for Electronic
Data Gathering and Retrieval system) at the Commission involved the design
of computer systems, a subject as to which the Commission has no claim of
expertise. In any case, everyone agrees that an efficient and effective system
of electronic filing and retrieval would further the objectives of the disclosure
and enforcement vision. 3
An understanding of the central intuition that motivates this book-4hat
expertise is an asset that can be used to create significant political power-is
not significantly advanced by this book. What the book does convey is an
understanding of the issues confronting the SEC in recent years and the
responses of both the Commission and the Congress to readers unfamiliar with
the activities of the SEC.
11. Page 133.
12. I am referring here to when it enacted section 4(6), 15 U.S.C. § 77d(6), in 1979.
13. As sketched at length in Langevoort, Information Technology and the Structure of Securities
Regulation, 80 Harvard 747 (1985).
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